Humans experiencing different background emotional states display contrasting cognitive (e.g. judgement) biases when responding to ambiguous stimuli. We have proposed that such biases may be used as indicators of animal emotional state. Here, we used a spatial judgement task, in which animals were trained to expect food in one location and not another, to determine whether rats in relatively positive or negative emotional states respond differently to ambiguous stimuli of intermediate spatial location. We housed 24 rats with environmental enrichment for 7 weeks. We removed the enrichment from half the animals prior to the start of training to induce a relatively negative emotional state, whereas we left it in place for the remaining rats. After 6 training days, the rats successfully discriminated between the rewarded and the unrewarded locations in terms of an increased latency to arrive at the unrewarded location, with no housing treatment difference. The subjects then underwent 3 days of testing in which three ambiguous 'probe' locations, intermediate between the rewarded and the unrewarded locations, were introduced. There was no difference between the treatments in the rats' judgement of two of the three probe locations, the exception being when the ambiguous probe was positioned closest to the unrewarded location. This result suggests that rats housed without enrichment, and in an assumed relatively negative emotional state, respond differently to an ambiguous stimulus compared to rats housed with enrichment, providing evidence that cognitive biases may be used to assess animal emotional state in a spatial judgement task.
The study of animal emotions is gaining increasing credence within the research community including psychology, neuroscience and behaviour (e.g. Rolls 2000; LeDoux 2003; Paul et al. 2005) . Furthermore, the assumption that animals experience emotional states is likely to underpin public concern about animal welfare, and investigations of such states are thus of central importance in animal welfare science (e.g. Dawkins 1990 Dawkins , 2006 Mendl & Paul 2004) . Emotional states are widely regarded by contemporary emotion researchers as comprising subjective, behavioural, physiological and cognitive components (e.g. Winkielman et al. 1997; Bradley & Lang 2000; Paul et al. 2005 ). It is not currently possible to obtain direct measures of the subjective component of emotional experience. Therefore, when we refer to animal emotion in this paper we cannot assume an accompanying conscious experience, even if other components of the emotional response are present.
Current methodologies for investigating emotions include the measurement of physiological and behavioural 'indicators' of stress and welfare (e.g. Broom 1991; Hurst et al. 1999; Abou-Ismail et al. 2007; Burman et al. 2007) dmeasures that are associated with putative aversive experiences. There are also many behavioural tests of fear and anxiety developed in neuroscience and psychopharmacology research (e.g. Ramos & Mormède 1998; File & Seth 2003; Paul et al. 2005) 
